Chapter 8: Securitization and the Financial Crisis of 2007-8
3 min readSecuritization
Securitization is the process of pooling assets (mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans) and selling claims on the resulting cash flows to investors.
Key structures:
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS)
The underlying assets generate cash flows that are used to pay security holders. The structure can be:
- Pass-through: All principal and interest payments flow directly to investors
- Tranched (waterfall): Cash flows are allocated in a priority order to different tranches
Tranche Structure
| Tranche | Priority | Risk | Typical Rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| Senior/Super-senior | First claim on cash | Lowest | AAA |
| Mezzanine | Middle claim | Medium | A to BBB |
| Equity | Residual claim | Highest | Unrated |
Losses are first absorbed by the equity tranche, then mezzanine, then senior. This is called a waterfall structure.
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)
An ABS backed by a pool of debt instruments. ABS CDOs are particularly relevant to the crisis — they were CDOs backed by tranches of other ABS (mainly those backed by subprime mortgages).
The US Housing Market
Key developments leading up to the crisis:
- Low interest rates in the early 2000s boosted housing demand
- Relaxed lending standards: subprime mortgages (low/no documentation, adjustable rates with teaser periods, high loan-to-value ratios)
- Home prices doubled between 2000 and 2006
- Many borrowers relied on continued price appreciation to refinance
What Went Wrong?
The Chain of Events
- 2006-2007: US house prices started falling
- Subprime defaults: Borrowers couldn't refinance or afford reset mortgage payments
- ABS CDO losses: As mortgage defaults increased, ABS tranches downgraded, ABS CDOs suffered massive losses
- Bank write-downs: Banks holding CDOs on their balance sheets reported huge losses
- Loss of confidence: Interbank lending froze because no one knew which banks were exposed
Additional Factors
- Misaligned incentives: Originators sold mortgages to securitizers without retaining risk
- Rating agencies: AAA ratings on complex structured products proved inaccurate
- Model risk: Correlation models underestimated the probability of simultaneous defaults
- Off-balance-sheet vehicles (SIVs): Banks held risky assets in entities that didn't appear on their balance sheets
- Leverage: Investment banks operated with leverage ratios of 30:1 or higher
The Aftermath
- Bank failures and bailouts: Lehman Brothers collapsed (September 15, 2008); Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac were bailed out
- Regulatory response: Dodd-Frank Act (2010) introduced stricter capital requirements, centralized clearing for standardized derivatives, and restrictions on proprietary trading (Volcker Rule)
- Basel III/IV: Higher capital requirements, liquidity coverage ratios, and leverage ratios for banks
- Risk management revolution: Greater emphasis on understanding model limitations, stress testing, and counterparty credit risk